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THE PLAIN MEANING OF ONCALE
Catherine J. Lanctot*
The unanimous Supreme Court opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc. caught many observers by surprise. Even more surprising than the
Court's unanimity on the divisive issue of same-sex harassment, however, was the
author of the opinion-the deeply conservative Justice Antonin Scalia. Many
commentators suggest that the opinion's requirement that plaintiffs prove that the
harassment was "because of sex" will hamper lawsuits arising from single-sex work
environments. Attempts tofit the decision within traditional Title VIIjurisprudence
inevitably will be clouded by conjecture about Scalia's true intent. Indeed, after one
year of experience with Oncale, the judicial record is decidedly mixed The debate
over Oncale's meaning has manifested itself most clearly in an emerging dispute
over the role of summary judgment in resolving harassment cases. Nevertheless, in
attempting to apply a new Supreme Court opinion, particularly one joined by all
nine Justices, it is the holding of the opinion that must guide the lower courts, not
the assorted examples, exhortations, and suggestions that accompany it. The way
to make sense of Oncale is to take it at face value, as a victory for a plaintiff who
alleged particularly egregious harassment.
"It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver. '
INTRODUCTION
The unanimous Supreme Court opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.2 caught many observers ly surprise.3 The issue of whether same-sex
Professor of Law, Villanova University Law School. A.B., Brown University, 1978;
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1981.
I Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
2 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
3 Post-Oncale commentary includes: Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence ofSexual
Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1169 (1998); Robert Brookins, A Rose by Any Other
Name: The Gender Basis of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 441 (1998);
Charles R. Calleros, Same-Sex Harassment, Textualism, Free Speech, and Oncale: Laying
the Groundwork for a Coherent and Constitutional Theory of Sexual Harassment Liability,
7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1 (1998); Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo
Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 307 (1998); Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex
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sexual harassment was cognizable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
had divided the lower federal courts and spawned much commentary in recent years.
In light of this ongoing dispute, it appeared likely that the Supreme Court would split
on the issue as well. 4 Instead, the Supreme Court, in a brief opinion, announced that
there was no statutory bar to such lawsuits and provided some guidance as to how
lower courts were to address this cause of action.' Even more surprising than the
Court's unanimity on this divisive issue, however, was the author of the opinion-the
deeply conservative Justice Antonin Scalia, who had expressed in vigorous dissents
in recent years his well-known antipathy toward expansion of discrimination
principles in general and toward providing protection for homosexuals in particular.6
Many commentators pounced on this apparent paradox to speculate that Oncale
was not the boon for plaintiffs that it seemed to be, but rather a clever way to limit
sexual harassment suits generally.7 Commentators have characterized Oncale as
Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the Boundaries ofActionable Conduct,
47 AM. U. L.REv. 677 (1998); Gabriel A. Terrasa, Fitting a Square Peg into a Round Hole:
"Same-Sex" Sexual Harassment and the "Because of... Sex" Requirement in Hostile
Environment Claims, 67 REViSTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO 163 (1998);
S. Ashby Williams, Comment, Long Overdue: The Actionability of Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment Claims Under Title VII, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 895 (1998).
' See generally Lyle Denniston, A Curveball on Same-Sex Harassment, AM. LAW., Mar.
1998, at 90 (describing the oral argument in Oncale).
See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003.
6 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
' See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122,
329 (1998) (stating that the Oncale decision was "an initial step toward foreclosing a broader
conception of sexual harassment"); Dominic Bencivenga, Same-Sex Harassment Ruling Puts
Work Environment Under Scrutiny, 219 N.Y. L.J. 5 (1998) ("[M]anagement attorneys
predicted that the 'because of sex' standard and the reasonableness test, which are only
broadly outlined in the ruling, may make it easier to eliminate cases early."); Deanna Hodgin,
Nino's Gift Horse, RECORDER, Mar. 6, 1998, at 4
(The result seems to be in harmony with Scalia's conservative vision: If
everyone is treated equally poorly, the context and comparability defenses would
seem to exempt universally bad actors from prosecution. Imagine that-a
veritable get-out-of-jail-free pass for workers whose harassment targets both men
and women. It may be that Scalia has authored a guide to PC harassment: Do it
to everyone equally and you'll be fine. The mouth of this gift horse bears close
examination.);
Michel Lee, Last Term's Employment Decisions Have Shaken up the Status Quo, 220 N.Y.
L.J. 1 (1998) (stating that Oncale will "set up a bulwark that will impede many claims");
Michael Rabinowitch, 'Same Gender' Sexual Harassment After Oncale and City of
Belleville, IND. LAW., Apr. 29, 1998, at 4 (arguing that Oncale and the remand of City of
Belleville, Ill. v. Doe, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183
(1998), "clearly give[] some indication that the plaintiff's burden in such cases will be
extremely difficult and protection made available only in certain very limited
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"cryptic" 8 and "perplexing." 9 Although some hail it as a victory, 0 others have
suggested that the opinion's requirement that plaintiffs prove the harassment was
"because of . . . sex" 1 would hamper lawsuits arising from single-sex work
environments." The fact that the case left open a number of difficult questions about
same-sex harassment also sparked criticism. " Others contend that the opinion makes
it more difficult for litigants to survive motions for summary judgment. 4 Much of
circumstances"); David G. Savage, Signs of Disagreement: Scalia May Have Sown Seeds of
Dissent in Same-Sex Ruling, 84 A.B.A. J. 50 (May 1998); Jeffrey M. Schlossberg, The
Pendulum Swings Back in Sexual Harassment Cases, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 1998, at 1
([T]he Court may be paving the way for stricter scrutiny of sexual harassment
claims in general.... The Court devoted the balance of its opinion to clarifying
the parameters of sexual harassment generally. The fact that it did so is
significant for while rendering a decision that on its face opens the door to a
greater number of potential plaintiffs, the Court'also appears to have sent a
message that reveals its dissatisfaction with the plethora of sexual harassment
suits today.);
Michael Subit, Oncale May Narrow Sexual-HarassmentLaw, 151 N.J. L.J. 1136, 1136
(1998) (presenting for a "narrower view of sexual harassment"); Sidney R. Steinberg, U.S.
Supreme Court Decision in Oncale Answers Some Questions Raise Others, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 11, 1998, at 7.
8 See Storrow, supra note 3, at 677, 678 & n.6 ("The struggle continues in light of
Oncale's cryptic message about when same-sex sexual harassment is actionable.").
' Kathryn Abrams, Postscript, Spring 1998: A Response to Professors Bernstein and
Franke, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1257, 1261 (1998).
" See Thomas M. Sipkins & Joseph G. Schmitt, Same-Sex Harassers Get Equal Time,
NAT'L L.J., June 8, 1998, at B7 ("The Oncale decision has been greeted by a variety of dire
predictions that Title VII will become a general civility code for the workplace and result in
a flood of lawsuits in federal court.").
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
2 See, e.g., Christine Cesare & Lisa Lerner, Same-Sex Harassment Ruling Leaves
Employers to Grapple with Distinction, 5 EMPLOYMENT L. STRATEGIST, Apr. 1998, at I
("The Supreme Court's opinion may be viewed, at least in part, as helpful to employers.");
Marcia Coyle, Victor in Court's Same-Sex Ruling Faces Tough Trial, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16,
1998, at A10 (arguing that it may be more difficult for Oncale to prove his case after the
Supreme Court's opinion); Debra S. Katz & Lynne Bemabei, Sex Harassment Cases Create
Uncertainties, 14 TEX. LAW. 28, 28 (1998) ("It is ironic that the court has effectively created
a myriad of new issues since it appears that one of its chief objectives-at least in the Title
VII context-was to reduce the number of suits by placing the primary burden on businesses
to eliminate sexual harassment.").
" See, e.g., Cesare & Lemer, supra note 12, at 12 (noting that issues of single-sex work
environment and questions about anti-gay harassment are left open); Katz & Bemabei, supra
note 12 (identifying difficulties for same-sex harassment based on sexual orientation and
lamenting the lack of guidance on harassment in single-sex work environments); Lee, supra
note 7, at 1 (arguing that implications for suits challenging harassment based on anti-gay
animus are unclear).
"' See, e.g., Bencivenga, supra note 7, at 5 (asserting that a "common sense" standard
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the analysis has highlighted Oncale's call for "common sense," in evaluating sexual
harassment claims "in context," as evidence that Justice Scalia intentionally sowed
the seeds of destruction in his opinion;'5 rather than being viewed as a victory for
plaintiffs, Oncale has been characterized as a "Trojan horse."' 6
What did Justice Scalia mean to accomplish in Oncale? Attempts to fit the
decision within traditional Title VII jurisprudence inevitably will be clouded by
conjecture about Scalia's true intent. Regardless of such speculation, however, the
fact remains that it is the lower courts, not professors and pundits, who will be the
first to decide what message, if any, the Court sought to convey in Oncale about
sexual harassment litigation. After one year of experience with Oncale, the judicial
record is decidedly mixed. Some of the open issues identified by early commentators,
such as Oncale's applicability to bisexual harassers or to anti-homosexual
harassment, already have emerged in reported decisions.' 7 Moreover, a number of
may make it difficult to dispose of cases on summary judgment); John W. Hamlin, Questions
on Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Remain After Oncale, CONN. L. TRIB., Mar. 16, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws file (arguing that ambiguous standards may make
summary judgment less likely); Bertrand C. Sellier, Summary Judgment in Sexual
Harassment Cases, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 29, 1998, at I ("The Supreme Court's reference to
'courts' can fairly be read as an admonition to district judges to use summary judgment in
appropriate cases to weed out claims that 'a reasonable person' could not find 'severely
hostile or abusive."'). But see Lee, supra note 7, at I ("[T]he Court seems to place the
harassment determination squarely in the province of the jury.").
's See Cesare & Lerner, supra note 12, at 12.
It is somewhat unusual to have Justice Scalia as the author of a three-page
unanimous opinion that creates a new class of claims, but offers little guidance
on where to draw the line between a permissible fraternal atmosphere in the
workplace and one that is tinged with unlawful discrimination by members of the
same sex.
Id.; see also Hamlin, supra note 14 (highlighting one "troubling passage" because it "can
hardly be characterized as (and is clearly not intended to be) objective"); Savage, supra note
7, at 51 (quoting an expert's comment that "'Oncale may have expanded the coverage but
restricted the liability under the law'); Schlossberg, supra note 7, at I
(The numerous examples of permissible conduct cited by the Court could serve
as the basis in subsequent cases for courts to conclude that the Supreme Court
is willing to entertain a wider latitude of behavior in the workplace than
previously permitted. This conclusion would be based in large part on the fact
that the Court seems to have gone to unnecessary lengths to articulate
permissible behavior, especially in an opinion that in theory should be limited
to the issue of same-sex sexual harassment.);
Jenna Ward, High Court's 'Oncale' May Cut Both Ways, RECORDER, Mar. 5, 1998, at 1
("[Oncale is a] decision which appears to give with one hand but take away with the other.").
6 See Hodgin, supra note 7, at 4 ("While he copped some very good press this week for
his long-awaited opinion on same-sex employment discrimination, Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia succeeded in making a Trojan horse gift to the plaintiffs' employment bar.").
'" See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., No. 97-3265, 1999 WL 80735, at * 14 (7th Cir.
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opinions have construed Oncale's language about considering these claims in context
as a signal from the Supreme Court to scrutinize sexual harassment cases more
closely and to enter judgment for defendants in advance of and, at times in spite of,
a jury verdict for plaintiffs."8 The ensuing debate over the appropriate role of
summary judgment in sexual harassment lawsuits already looms as one of the most
significant results of Oncale.
Unfortunately, the critical fact that the plaintiff below prevailed in Oncale and
that the Supreme Court recognized, for the first time, the availability of federal relief
for same-sex sexual harassment disappears into the fog. Indeed, the efforts to
interpret Oncale may be based on a false premise-the notion that the intent of the
opinion's author, rather than the actual holding of the case, is the key to
understanding its meaning. Such a reading of Oncale is ironic in light of Justice
Scalia's antipathy toward attempts at deducing legislative intent in construing
statutes. 9 Indeed, although Scalia is no liberal on civil rights issues, his "intent" with
respect to federal antidiscrimination laws is not as easily determined as media
commentary might indicate, because Oncale is only one in a series of unanimous
opinions Scalia has authored in recent employment discrimination cases, and his own
approach to the law of sexual harassment has been less dogmatic than some might
expect. Thus, although the holding and the language of Oncale may be sending
mixed signals, courts should resolve ambiguities in favor of plaintiffs unless and until
the Supreme Court clearly states otherwise.
In the final analysis, an Oncale opinion written by Antonin Scalia ought to mean
the same thing as an identical opinion by Ruth Bader Ginsburg. It takes little
imagination to speculate that the commentary on Oncale would have been far
different had Justice Ginsburg issued Oncale under her signature. Commentators and
scholars would have been convinced that Oncale's language urging careful attention
to common sense and context reflected a strong signal from Ginsburg to the lower
courts to take sexual harassment claims" seriously and to let more cases go to thejury.
Giving more weight to the perceived intent of the author of a Supreme Court opinion
than to its holding can only lead to disarray, as the brief history of Oncale reflects.
Feb. 19, 1999).
" See Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 74-75 (D. Me.
1998); Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 493 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
"9 Countless articles attempt to describe, define, deconstruct, or defend Scalia's approach
to statutory construction. For a recent analysis that includes some discussion of Oncale, see
Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REv. 4, 22-
23 (1998). For other expositions, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court
Read The Federalist But Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1301
(1998) (examining the textualist approach of Scalia and Thomas); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1509 (1998) (analyzing Scalia's theory
of "new textualism").
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This Article will review Justice Scalia's opinion in Oncale and briefly address
the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Doe v. Belleville, Illinois," which the Supreme
Court remanded immediately after it decided Oncale. It then will survey relevant
lower court decisions decided since Oncale to highlight the emerging controversy
over the role of summary judgment in sexual harassment cases. Finally, it will show
why attempts to discern Justice Scalia's true intent in Oncale inevitably must fail,
and why the lower courts instead simply ought to apply the plain meaning of Oncale
for the foreseeable future.
I. SAME-SEX HARASSMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. Justice Scalia's Opinion in Oncale
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,21 the Supreme Court considered
an issue that had closely divided the courts of appeals and had received substantial
media attention-whether allegations of same-sex sexual harassment were cognizable
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.22 Joseph Oncale, an employee on an
eight-man oil platform crew, alleged that he had been harassed sexually by his fellow
male employees, by "sex-related, humiliating actions against him," including physical
assault and the threat of rape.23 Oncale quit his job in fear of further harassment24
and later filed suit, alleging that he had been discriminated against in his employment
because of his sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.25 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary
judgment for the employer, holding that there was no cause of action under Title VII
for harassment by male coworkers.26 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
20 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
21 '118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
23 Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001. The actions he challenged included the forcible insertion
of a piece of soap into his anus, and are detailed in Note, Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REv.
122, 327 (1998). Rather than recite these facts, Justice Scalia asserted: "The precise details
are irrelevant to the legal point we must decide, and in the interest of both brevity and dignity
we shall describe them only generally." Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000. This delicacy has been
criticized as disingenuous. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 1258 n.8 (suggesting that Scalia was
"holding the sexual harassment claim somewhat uncomfortably at arms' length"); Ward,
supra note 15, at I (noting that the attorney for amicus curiae Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund "attributed its PG-rated content to 'squeamishness' and 'homophobia' and
noted that the Court's omission of description of the egregious conduct would make it more
difficult for lower courts to interpret the opinion).
24 Oncale alleged that his complaints to supervisors went unanswered and that at least one
supervisor called him a name suggesting homosexuality. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
26 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 769 (E.D.
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for the Fifth Circuit affirmed," based on its previous decision in Garcia v. Elf
Atochem North America, in which it held that same-sex harassment suits were not
cognizable under Title VII.28 The circuits had become increasingly divided over this
issue,29 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve it.
The Court construed a deceptively simple statutory provision and asked if
"discrimination... because of... sex"3 includes workplace harassment when the
harasser and the harassed employees are of the same sex. The Court's landmark
decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson had extended the phrase "because
of sex" to reach sexual harassment generally in the workplace,3 and the Court had
expanded the reach of that opinion further in its unanimous decision in Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc.32 As Justice Scalia noted, the Court previously had held that
Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination protects men as well as women in
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC.33 Explaining that there is no
basis to presume that a male would never discriminate against a male,34 Justice Scalia
announced: "If our precedents leave any doubt on the question, we hold today that
nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of ... sex'
merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting on
behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex."35
La. Mar. 24, 1995).
27 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
28 See Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
29 Some courts had held that same-sex sexual harassment claims never are cognizable
under Title VII. See, e.g., Goluszek v. H. P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. I11. 1988).
Other courts had held that such claims were cognizable only if the plaintiff could prove that
the harasser was homosexual. See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d
1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir.
1996). Other courts had taken a third approach, suggesting that any harassment that is sexual
in content is actionable under Title VII. See Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 566
(7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998). For a detailed analysis of
the state of the law prior to Oncale, see Storrow, supra note 3, at 689-93.
30 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
3' Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
32 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
33 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983).
34 See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977); see also Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (holding that a county agency did not violate
Title VII when, pursuant to an affirmative action plan, it promoted a female employee over
a male employee with higher test scores).
31 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001-02 (1998).
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This holding did not necessarily resolve the broader issue of whether sexual
harassment of one male by another is susceptible to redress under Title VII.36 Justice
Scalia asserted: "We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents
for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of
Title VII. ''3" Rejecting the assertions of some courts that such harassment was
"assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title
VII," 38 Justice Scalia in typical fashion treated such reliance on legislative intent as
misplaced, noting: "[I]t is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. 39 He continued:
"Title VII prohibits 'discrimination . . . because of... sex' in the 'terms' or
'conditions' of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must
extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements." '4 To
this point, the Oncale opinion easily might be explained as a reflection of Scalia's
textualism, stressing the plain meaning of statutory language and rejecting resort to
legislative history or other expressions of legislative intent.4'
The controversy over Oncale, however, emerges from the remainder of the
opinion. Acknowledging concerns that permitting same-sex harassment lawsuits
could "transform Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace," '42
Scalia noted that this danger is equally present in more traditional harassment cases
as well, and can be "adequately met by careful attention to the requirements of the
statute. 43 He then set forth what those requirements might be. In particular, Scalia
emphasized that harassment suits brought under Title VII are discrimination suits
and, as such, must establish that the plaintiff suffered disparate treatment at the hands
of the employer." The critical issue, then, will be to establish that "'members of one
sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed."' 45 Thus, not all workplace harassment
is actionable under Title VII, even if "the words used have sexual content or
36 See id.
37 Id. at 1002.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
4' For a recent discussion of textualism as articulated by Justice Scalia, see Adrian
Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of
Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1833, 1836 (1998).
42 Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
43 Id.
44 See id. at 1003.
"s Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
[Vol. 7:3
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connotations." '6 Rather, the plaintiff must prove that he or she was treated differently
"because of sex.,
47
How might a plaintiff make this showing in a harassment case? Scalia noted that
this inference will be drawn most easily in cases of "explicit or implicit proposals of
sexual activity," and for same-sex harassment this inference would be available "if
there were credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual., 4, Even in the
absence of such a showing, however, a same-sex harassment plaintiff may "offer
direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both
sexes in a mixed-sex workplace." ' Regardless of the method of proof chosen, the
plaintiff "must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with
offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted 'discrimination... because
of ... sex.'
50
Although Oncale's emphasis on the disparate treatment aspect of harassment has
proven to be controversial, it is the final substantive paragraph of the opinion that has
provided the most fodder for those seeking to limit sexual harassment suits. Scalia
noted cryptically that "[Title VII] does not reach genuine but innocuous differences
in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of
the opposite sex" and that the statute "requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in
the workplace."'" Reiterating the teaching of Harris that the challenged conduct
must be "severe" and "pervasive" enough to create an "objectively hostile or abusive
work environment,"52 Justice Scalia asserted that this requirement is "crucial" and
"sufficient to ensure that courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the
workplace-such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation-for
46 Id at 1002.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. One might characterize Justice Thomas's one sentence concurrence as a reflection
of this approach. His opinion, in full, reads as follows: "I concur because the Court stresses
that in every sexual harassment case, the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title VII's
statutory requirement that there be discrimination 'because of... sex."' Id. at 1003 (Thomas,
J., concurring); see The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 328
n.38 (describing Thomas's opinion as "elliptical"). Justice Thomas's dissent in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2271 (1998), joined by Justice Scalia, also
emphasized the disparate treatment nature of harassment lawsuits by noting: "Popular
misconceptions notwithstanding, sexual harassment is not a freestanding federal tort, but a
form of employment discrimination. As such, it should be treated no differently (and certainly
no better) than the other forms of harassment that are illegal under Title VII." Ellerth, 118
S. Ct. at 2275.
s' Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002-03.
2 d. at 1003 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
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discriminatory 'conditions of employment."'' 3 As an example of how all the facts
and circumstances of such "horseplay" ought to be weighed, Justice Scalia asserted:
A professional football player's working environment is not severely or
pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks
as he heads onto the field-even if the same behavior would reasonably
be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary (male or female) back
at the office. 4
The most-debated portion of Oncale is Scalia's urging that the lower courts give
"careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and
is experienced by its target," explaining that "[t]he real social impact of workplace
behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of
the words used or the physical acts performed."" He asserted: "Common sense, and
an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish
between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and
conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely
hostile or abusive. 56
Although the Court remanded Oncale to much speculation about its possible
outcome, it ultimately had little impact on subsequent legal developments. Perhaps
in response to widespread publicity, or to the particularly egregious conduct outlined
in the complaint, the case settled just before trial in October 1998."7
B. Remand of Doe v. City of Belleville, Illinois
For those attempting to construe the meaning of Oncale, another signal came
from the Supreme Court just six days later. Without opinion, the Court vacated the
53 Id.
54 id.
55 Id.
56 Id At least one commentator has praised this passage as a "model ofjudicious context-
specificity." Abrams, supra note 9, at 1257, 1258-59 ("[A] remarkable call for
contextualization in the assessment of sexual harassment, tempered only by Scalia's confident
and perhaps solipsistic suggestion that one can resolve these cases with a healthy dose of
common sense."). Another commentator, however, worried: "Common sense and sensitivity
to social context are indeed essential, but absent some conception of what Title VII is
about-some conception of 'what's wrong with sexual harassment'-they are hardly
sufficient to distinguish between conduct that is and is not proscribed by Title VII." Dorf,
supra note 19, at 22.
" Sun Sets on Sundowner, TEX. LAW., Nov. 2, 1998, at 3 (stating that the parties finalized
a settlement October 21, six days before trial was scheduled to begin; terms were
confidential).
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judgment in Doe v. City of Belleville, Illinois," and remanded it to the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light of Oncale.59
Because the lower court's Doe opinion had provided an extensive analysis of same-
sex sexual harassment, its rejection by the Supreme Court furnished further
ammunition for those who read Oncale as a pro-employer opinion.60 In Doe, twin
teenage brothers claimed harassment by heterosexual male coworkers at their summer
job, including homosexual epithets and sexual threats as well as at least one physical
assault. Reversing the entry of summary judgment for the city, the Seventh Circuit
held that same-sex harassment was actionable under Title VII under the "plain,
unambiguous language of the statute.'
Although the actual holding in Doe is consistent with that in Oncale, as is Doe's
cautionary discussion of "horseplay," 2 other aspects of Judge Rovner's opinion are
more problematic. In particular, the court asserted that a plaintiff can prove that
same-sex harassment is "because of sex" from either the sexual character of the
harassment or from the sexual stereotyping by the harassers that led to the conduct.63
The court suggested that explicitly sexual harassment sufficed to "demonstrate[] the
nexus to the plaintiffs gender that Title VII requires. 64 Indeed, in Doe, the court
appeared to reject the model of disparate treatment for harassment that subsequently
was adopted in Oncale, asserting:
Proof that the harasser was motivated to target (or in practice did target)
one gender and not the other may be necessary where the harassment is
not on its face sexual, as we have discussed, but such proof would seem
unnecessary when the harassment itself is imbued with sexual overtones.65
58 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
9 City of Belleville, I1l. v. Doe, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
60 The Oncale opinion criticized the Doe holding. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
6 Doe, 119 F.3d at 573.
62 Id. at 575.
We have never made the viability of sexual harassment claims dependent upon
the sexual orientation of the harasser, and we are convinced that it would be both
unwise and improper to begin doing so. Fears that if such a requirement is not
imposed, commonplace "horseplay" will give rise to sexual harassment claims
are, we believe, unfounded. Sexual harassment law already provides the means
for distinguishing between isolated instances of non-severe harassment and the
truly hostile working environment.
Id.
63 Id. at 575 (citing "the harassers' evident belief that in wearing an earring, H. Doe did
not conform to male standards").
'4 Id. at 577 ("In view of the overt references to H.'s gender and the repeated allusions
to sexual assault, it would appear unnecessary to require any further proof that H.'s gender
had something to do with this harassment; the acts speak for themselves in that regard.").
65 Id. at 577-78.
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* . . Looked at in another light, the explicitly sexual harassment of a
female worker amounts to sex discrimination in violation of Title VII not
simply because her harasser might be heterosexual, and thus would not
be sexually interested in a man, and not simply because a man might not
encounter comparable harassment in the workplace, but because her
employment is now conditioned upon her willingness to endure
harassment that is inseparable from her gender.66
In addition, the court noted that same-sex harassment stemming from sexual
stereotyping about appropriate male or female behavior also was actionable under the
rationale of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.67
Finally, in addressing the concerns that same-sex harassment claims will open
the floodgates of litigation, the court responded:
Interestingly, very similar concerns were expressed when courts rejected
the first claims of sexual harassment brought by women in the 1970s ....
Here we are, twenty years later, and the sky has not fallen. We are not,
it turns out, incapable of distinguishing between the occasional off-color
joke, stray remark, or rebuffed proposition, and a work environment that
is rendered hostile by severe or pervasive harassment. We are well
practiced in examining sexual harassment from the objective viewpoint
of the reasonable individual as well as the subjective view of the plaintiff.
When a man complains that he has been sexually harassed by another
man, then, we know how to distinguish between harassment and
"horseplay"; we have been making that very distinction for years in the
cases that female plaintiffs have brought.68
Thus, so long as the environment itself is hostile to the plaintiff because of her
sex, why the harassment was perpetrated (sexual interest? misogyny? personal
vendetta? misguided humor? boredom?) is beside the point. If H. and J. were
twin brother and sister, for example, it would not be permissible for their
co-workers to pervasively refer to J. as "the chick," to grab her breasts, and to
threaten to undress and assault her ostensibly to tell the two of them apart.
Whatever the reason she were [sic] harassed in this way, the work environment
would be rendered hostile to J. as a woman.
Id
Id. at 579. The court also noted the difficulties with a traditional disparate treatment
model: "How is a plaintiff to show disparate treatment if he is the only individual being
harassed, for example? And how could he ever hope to show disparate treatment in a work
environment populated entirely by men, as the Does' workplace was?" Id. at 583.
67 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See Doe, 119 F.3d at 580.
68 Doe, 119 F.3d at 591.
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In a sharp dissent, Judge Manion asserted that motive to discriminate on the basis
of sex was essential to a sexual harassment claim. 9 He stated:
The language of the statute is not meaningless; unless the behavior at
issue is motivated (at least in part) by the victim's sex, no cause of action
can lie. It will be a truly rare case of same-sex harassment where this
burden is satisfied. When a man harasses a man, or a woman harasses a
woman, an inference does not arise that the harassment was because of
the victim's sex. My colleagues assure us that the sky has not fallen,
suggesting I suppose that federal courts will not be swamped by men or
women claiming harassment by coworkers of the same sex. Perhaps not,
but that never was the concern. The concern always will be the standards
by which we define a cause of action not specifically described in a
statute, and our proper reluctance to extend such claims further and
further away from their statutory moorings.7
In light of this sharp division, the Court's remand of Doe seemed to emphasize
that in Oncale the Court had rejected an expansive reading of same-sex harassment
and to reiterate the Court's insistence on a disparate treatment framework for all
harassment cases.
III. ONCALE IN THE LOWER COURTS
The lower courts ultimately determine what a new Supreme Court case means.
Despite its pro-plaintiff holding, Oncale has been used as support for restricting
sexual harassment claims in many reported opinions. In the past year, as federal
courts have attempted to parse the language of Oncale, there has been much
inconsistency in the meaning various courts have given to Scalia's opinion. It may
be surprising to some that the case itself seems to have spawned relatively few same-
69 Id. at 597 (Manion, J., dissenting). Judge Manion also rejected the notion that Title VII
addresses so-called "sexuality harassment"-harassment somehow sexual in nature-
explaining:
Rather, if raunchy sexual banter is directed at an employee by coworkers of the
same sex because they do not like him, do not respect him, want to tease him,
want to embarrass him, or simply want to "initiate" him into a rather disgusting
workplace, under the court's new standard employees targeted by such
mean-spirited teasing could have a claim merely by the sexual nature of the
teasing. Perhaps judges think an expansion is necessary because Congress has
not sufficiently asserted itself in cleaning up such workplaces. But that is not the
court's role.
Id. at 602.
70 Id. at 607.
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sex harassment cases. Instead, Oncale has been cited most frequently by lower courts
in more traditional sexual harassment cases, usually brought by women against men.
The cases have begun to highlight some of the questions left open after Oncale, such
as its applicability to the so-called "equal opportunity harasser" and to single-sex
work environments. More noteworthy, however, is an emerging split over whether
the Court's intent in Oncale was to encourage more frequent use of summary
judgment to resolve harassment claims, or whether, instead, the Court's emphasis on
"common sense" and "context" signaled a desire to leave such questions to juries
rather than to federal judges.
As of February 1999, only a handful of reported opinions have relied on Oncale
to resolve claims of same-sex sexual harassment.7 ' The most notable pro-plaintiff
opinion to date is Bailey v. Runyon,72 in which the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reversed entry ofjudgment as a matter of law for the defendant.
The court noted that the evidence of same-sex harassment by a coworker should have
been weighed by a jury because there is no distinguishable "bright line" between.
harassment and mere unpleasantness or vulgarity.73 Similarly, in one case resolved
in the plaintiff's favor, Bacon v. Art Institute of Chicago, a district court denied an
employer's motion for summary judgment on a same-sex harassment issue, holding
that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the male plaintiff was
harassed "because of' his sex when the male harasser photographed plaintiffs
buttocks and displayed the photograph, continually touched various parts of
plaintiffs body, and simulated sexual acts on plaintiff's body.74
In several other cases, however, the plaintiffs claim foundered on the question
of whether he had proven disparate treatment under Oncale.75 In Landrau Romero
v. Caribbean Restaurants, Inc.,76 the district court granted summary judgment to the
employer on a claim that a male supervisor winked at a male trainee and teased him,
as well as other male and female employees. The court cited the caution from Oncale
that courts distinguish "simple teasing" from severe and pervasive harassment.77
7' One other same-sex harassment case decided after Oncale, Ford v. Rigidply Rafters,
Inc., 999 F. Supp. 647 (D. Md. 1998), simply upheld a verdict for the plaintiff entered prior
to the Supreme Court case.
72 No. 98-1030, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1766 (8th Cir. Feb. 8, 1999).
71 Id. at *8-*9.
71 See Bacon v. Art Inst. of Chicago, 6 F. Supp. 2d 762, 768 (N.D. Il. 1998).
71 One appellate decision conceded that harassment resulting from the breakup of a
lesbian relationship would be actionable, but held that the plaintiff had not proven that the
harassment by her former lover was the cause of her termination. LLampallas v. Mini-
Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1248 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
76 14 F. Supp. 2d 185, 192 (D.P.R. 1998).
77 The court noted: "Thus, other than winking, there is no evidence in the record of
Figueroa making sexual advances on the plaintiff. Winking, in the context of plaintiff's other
allegations, at its worst amounts only to teasing." Id. at 189.
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Similarly, in Raum v. Laidlaw, Ltd.,T7 the district court rejected a sexual harassment
claim brought by a man against his male supervisor for a series of vulgar comments
when the record showed that the supervisor made similar remarks to everyone, male
and female. The court emphasized that "the plaintiff must show that he experienced
the hostility because of his membership in a protected class and not because the
environment was generally hostile to everyone, including people outside the
protected class. 79
A more comprehensive analysis of the disparate treatment aspect of Oncale
appeared in Holman v. Indiana,"° a case which raised the classic law school
hypothetical of the harasser who pursues both males and females indiscriminately.
In Holman, a husband and wife both claimed sexual harassment by a male foreman,
described by the district court as an "equal opportunity harasser."'" The district court
had held initially that such plaintiffs could not, as a matter of law, prove that the
harassment was "because of sex" if it affected both genders equally. 2 After Oncale,
the court reconsidered its holding in Holman, but reached the same conclusion. It
read Oncale as changing the prior law to require a showing of disparate treatment,
explaining:
Under the Supreme Court's analysis, presumably, if members of one sex
are exposed to identical disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment as the other sex, there is no Title VII discrimination. Such a
reading gives legitimacy to the various courts' findings that no liability
exists where both males and females in the workplace are accorded like
treatment.
8 3
78 No. 97-CV-1 11 (FJS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17969 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 1998).
Id. at *4 (holding that the alleged harasser merely "engaged in conduct that some
people of either gender may consider to be rude or vulgar behavior"). See Pavao v. Ocean
Ships, Inc., No. C-97-4059-VRW, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20431, at *4-*5 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
30, 1998) (asserting that "vulgar banter" did not cross the line that separates vulgarity from
harassment."); Burgess v. Gateway Communications, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18020 (S.D.W.
Va. Nov. 10, 1998) (examining vulgarity directed at both sexes).
80 No. 1:97 CV 0178, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18760, at *9-'*11 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 1, 1998).
slId. at *10-*ll1.
82 See id. at *7.
83 See id. at * 12-* 13. The court stated further:
Prior to the Oncale decision, these cases created the impression that it was
possible for both males and females to be sexually harassed by an "equal
opportunity harasser." This impression was created by language in these cases
which suggested that disparate treatment was not necessarily the gravamen of a
sex discrimination claim where the harassing conduct itself demonstrated some
gender animus. However, in light of the Supreme Court's reaffirmation that
proof that discrimination is "because of sex" requires a showing that "members
of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment
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It rejected the theory that the sexual nature of the harassment rendered the activity
"because of sex." 8
4
The anomaly of this rationale was not lost on the court. It noted:
Often the court is placed in the position of being the mediator between the
reality of legal doctrine and the dictates of common sense. The court
cannot deny that this is such a case. Certainly, the court is cognizant that
to decide as it does creates an anomalous result in sexual harassment
jurisprudence which leads to the questionable result that a supervisor who
harasses either a man or a woman can be liable but a supervisor who
harasses both cannot be. While the court finds that the equal opportunity
harasser escapes liability in the present case, it is not condoning the
existence of such conduct in the workplace. Simply put, the court
concludes that, under current Title VII jurisprudence, conduct occurring
equally to members of both genders cannot be discrimination "because of
sex."
85
The decision in Holman seems to be the result of an unnecessarily rigid reading
of Oncale, which said nothing directly about the phenomenon of the equal
opportunity harasser. First, the likelihood that such a harasser really would treat both
sexes "identically" seems fairly remote and, thus, in appropriate situations, there
could well be a triable issue of fact over whether men and women actually were
subjected to disparate treatment.8 6 Second, it is theoretically possible that such a
harasser could exhibit discriminatory animus toward one gender even though he or
she also harasses the other. A heterosexual male supervisor who physically assaults
a female coworker because he wants to drive women from the workplace, and who
to which members of the other sex are not exposed," the implications in these
cases are of questionable significance.
Id. at *20-*21.
84 Id. at *20-*21 ("While the court acknowledges plaintiffs' arguments that the very
sexual. nature of the harassment is sufficient to demonstrate that the harassing conduct would
not have occurred 'but for' the sex of each plaintiff, Oncale clearly indicates that this is not
necessarily a foregone conclusion."). This position had been taken prior to Oncale by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Doe v. City of Belleville, Illinois, 119 F.3d 563
(7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998), but the case was vacated and
remanded by the Supreme Court, rendering it of questionable vitality. See Holman, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18760, at *17 n.3.
85 Holman, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18760, at *23-*24 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998)).
86 See Calleros, supra note 3, at 38-42 ("Even when the harasser's harassment of men is
virtually identical in motive and technique to his harassment of women, the harassment
potentially can be viewed as discriminatory on a disparate impact analysis if men and women
experience the harassment in substantially different ways.").
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also physically assaults males in similar fashion out of some misguided notion of
"horseplay" would at least have the requisite discriminatory intent with respect to the
female plaintiff. Third, if ajury were to find that the allegations of harassment of
women were credible, but that the allegations of harassment of men were not,
disparate treatment would be proven. Thus, the articulation in Holman of a per Pe
rule to the contrary was both unnecessary and inconsistent with the plain meaning of
Oncale. In light of Oncale's emphasis on evidence of disparate treatment, however,
cases like Holman are likely to continue to grapple with the phenomenon of the equal
opportunity harasser.87
Another signal of future controversy under Oncale is the decision in Higgins v.
New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.," a case that addressed the question of whether anti-
gay harassment is harassment "because of sex" and thereby actionable under Title
VII. Unlike Oncale, in Higgins, the plaintiff was openly gay and the harassment
consisted largely of demeaning comments about homosexuals. In considering
whether this harassment was "because of sex" under the holding in Oncale, the court
explained: "Plaintiff cannot merely rely on the sexually explicit nature of his co-
workers' conduct to support his claim of sexual harassment. Rather, the key issue is
'whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."' 89 In Higgins, the
plaintiff argued that the discrimination was "because of gender" rather than "because
of sex." The district court explained its view that the two terms were distinguishable
because "while 'sex' tends to refer to an individual's physical characteristics and is
considered immutable, 'gender' is a broader concept which encompasses personality
features and socio-sexual roles typically associated with 'masculinity' or
'femininity.""° Nevertheless, the court rejected the attempt to "equate 'gender' with
'sexual orientation' under Title VII analysis" and granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment, holding that "Title VII does not provide a remedy to persons
who have experienced harassment motivated solely by animus toward the plaintiffs
sexual orientation."91
87 See, e.g., Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 97-50362, 1998 WL 792557, at *32
(5th Cir. Nov. 16, 1998) ("Irwin's sending of offensive materials to both men and women is
evidence that the workplace itself, while perhaps more sexually charged than necessary, was
not sexually charged in a way that made it a hostile environment for either men or women.").
88 21 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Me. 1998).
89 Id. at 74 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
90 Id. at 75.
9' Id. at 76. The court further stated:
In determining along with numerous other jurisdictions that Title VII does not
provide a remedy for discrimination based on sexual orientation, the Court does
not in any way condone this serious and pervasive activity in the American
workplace. The intolerable working conditions set forth in the cases denying
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In light of the Court's apparent reluctance to give further guidance on the
applicability of Oncale to same-sex harassment based on perceptions of
homosexuality, the issue addressed in Higgins is likely to continue to reappear. The
Oncale holding did not speak directly to this issue, however, and nothing in the
language of the opinion would preclude a potential plaintiff from asserting that he
was treated differently "because of sex," because his "effeminate" characteristics
would have been tolerated in a female but inspired hostility because he was a male.92
Indeed, a male plaintiff who alleges that he had been beaten by coworkers because
he likes to make quilts, for example, but shows that a female coworker who joins him
in these quilting bees is praised for her womanly skills, would be pleading a
quintessential example of disparate treatment "because of sex."
Nevertheless, the conceptual difficulties with disparate treatment as a model for
harassment cases make it difficult for lower courts to analyze same-sex claims.93
What may be more striking about the case law to date, however, is that courts have
interpreted Oncale as a signal from the Supreme Court about the proper way to
handle all harassment claims, not just the small subset of claims that are same-sex.
Although some courts have resolved cases in favor of plaintiffs,94 a number of
relief under Title VII for rampant discrimination based on sexual orientation call
for immediate remedial response by Congress.
Id. at 76 n.10.
92 Recent commentary has suggested that harassing conduct that reinforces gender
stereotypes, such as those at issue in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989),
could be actionable under Oncale. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998); The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Leading Cases,
supra note 7, at 333-35.
" The issue of proving disparate treatment in single-sex working environments is also
likely to spark controversy. See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, No. 1:97 CV 0178, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18760, at * II' n.2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 1, 1998) (stating that an employer has a defense
to harassment claims in single-sex work environments because "there is clearly no evidence
which could be presented to show that employees of the opposite gender were treated
differently"). The particular question of "social context" recently has been addressed by
Debra Raskin, a prominent plaintiff's lawyer, in Employment Discrimination-Sex: Effects
of Oncale are Discussed by Panel of Judges and Attorneys, 66 U.S.L.W. 2567 (Mar. 24,
1998). She warned of the possibility of"'a kind of assumption of the risk' argument when
an employee enters a traditionally sex-segregated workplace," using as an example the well-
known case of Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (1991). She
further noted that the case of Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., No. 97-1147 MNST, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2824 (8th Cir. Feb. 18, 1998), one of the few cases on the issue, rejected such
an argument even in light of a "widely-known 'culture' of sexual harassment in the mining
industry in Minnesota." Id. See also Calleros, supra note 3, at 36-38 (arguing that the
Supreme Court has placed an excessive burden on the plaintiff to prove disparate treatment).
9" See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 158 F.3d 1171, 1176 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (reversing in part
a directed verdict for defendant) (noting the Court's concerns in Oncale about "context" to
reject a claim that challenged conduct could not constitute harassment as a matter of law);
930 [Vol. 7:3
THE PLAIN MEANING OF ONCALE
appellate opinions have construed Oncale as a warning against expanding the sexual
harassment cause of action. Lower courts have given particular emphasis to the
Court's suggestions that mere sexual content alone is insufficient to meet the
"because of sex". prong,95 that not every incident amounts to harassment based on
disparate treatment,' even if there is some relationship to the gender or race of the
plaintiff,97 and that Title VII is not to be transformed into a "civility code." 98
The debate over Oncale's meaning has manifested itself most clearly in an
emerging dispute over the role of summary judgment in resolving harassment cases,
a battle foreseen by many commentators in the immediate aftermath of the decision.'
The use (or overuse) of summary judgment motions in resolving employment
discrimination cases has been a subject of controversy for many years."u The Court
Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998) (permitting the
plaintiff to proceed on a continuing violation theory).
9' See, e.g., Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 97-50362, 1998 WL 792557 (5th Cir.
Nov. 16, 1998); Richmond-Hopes v. City of Cleveland, No. 97-3595, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
29572 (6th Cir. Nov. 16, 1998) (per curiam) (affirming an entry of summary judgment in
favor of an employer when a female employee claimed her supervisor sexually harassed her
by simulating masturbation); Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 1998).
96 See Lissau v. Southern Food Servs., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 183 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming
in part and reversing in part a grant of summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability
for employers) ("Title VII does not provide a remedy for every instance of verbal or physical
harassment in the workplace."); Bravo v. Veterans Admin., No. 97-56646, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27845, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 1998) ("Because Bravo failed to establish that
statements made by or actions taken by his supervisor were sexual in nature, Bravo failed to
establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment."); Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 157
F.3d 824, 828 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (reversing ajury verdict in favor of the plaintiff's retaliatory
discharge claim because the conduct described by the plaintiff was not sufficient to support
an objectively reasonable belief that it was sexual harassment; in fact, it "misse[d] the mark
by a country mile").
17 See Penry v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir.
1998) (holding that the defendant's conduct with "gender-related implications," such as
taking female employees to Hooters Restaurant, was not "permeated with discriminatory
intimidation" but was "motivated by poor taste and a lack of professionalism rather than by
the plaintiffs' gender"); Bonner v. Payless Shoe Source, No. 97-2401, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 7438, at *5 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 1998) (per curiam) (affirming an entry of summary
judgment for the defendant because "not all of the purported harassing incidents cited by
Bonner were necessarily motivated by Bonner's race").
98 See Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assoc. of N. Tex., 139 F.3d 532, 540 (5th Cir.
1998) (affirming an entry of summary judgment for the defendant and holding that the
defendant's treatment of the plaintiff did "not amount to an adverse employment action").
99 In Lissau, one concurring judge asserted that the Supreme Court's recent sexual
harassment claims rendered summary judgment generally inappropriate because the inquiry
is "especially fact intensive." Lissau, 159 F.3d at 184 (Michael, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1o0 See supra notes 91-94. Judge Patricia Wald of the United States Court of Appeals for
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed this issue at some length in Gallagher
v. Delaney,'10 a sexual harassment case in which the lower court had entered
summary judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff, a secretary, had alleged that her
boss pestered her incessantly, without explicitly demanding sex or threatening
retaliation. °2 The district court found it "'doubtful that [plaintiff], or a reasonable
woman of her generation would find Hansen's conduct sexually harassing. '" 3
Sitting by designation, Judge Jack Weinstein of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York explained with typical frankness the appellate
court's decision to reverse and remand:
A federal judge is not in the best position to define the current sexual
tenor of American cultures in their many manifestations. Such an effort,
even were it successful, would produce questionable legal definitions for
the workplace where recognition of employees' dignity might require
standards higher than those of the street. . . .Today, while gender
relations in the workplace are rapidly evolving, and views of what is
appropriate behavior are diverse and shifting, a jury made up of a cross-
section of our heterogen[e]ous communities provides the appropriate
institution for deciding whether borderline situations should be
characterized as sexual harassment and retaliation. The factual issues in
this case cannot be effectively settled by a decision of an Article III judge
on summary judgment. Whatever the early life of a federal judge, she or
he usually lives in a narrow segment of the enormously broad American
socio-economic spectrum, generally lacking the current real-life
experience required in interpreting subtle sexual dynamics of the
workplace based on nuances, subtle perceptions, and implicit
communications."°
the District of Columbia Circuit recently described the "unseemly rush to summary
judgment" as a matter of particular concern in employment discrimination cases. Patricia M.
Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1897, 1938 (1998). Other commentators
have argued in favor of using summary judgment motions to weed out unmeritorious
discrimination cases before trial. See R. Alexander Acosta & Eric J. Von Vorys, Bursting
Bubbles and Burdens of Proof Deepening the Disagreement on the Summary Judgment
Standard in Disparate Treatment Employment Discrimination Cases, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
207, 209-10 (1998).
101 139 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 1998).
'02 See id at 343-45.
03 Id. at 346 (quoting the lower court's decision).
104 Id. at 342.
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He cautioned that "[t]he dangers of robust use of summary judgment to clear trial
dockets are particularly acute in current sex discrimination cases."'05  Judge
Weinstein concluded: "An Article III judge is not a hierophant of social graces.
Evaluation of ambiguous acts such as those revealed by the potential evidence in this
case presents an issue for the jury."'" Other courts also have treated Oncale as a
signal to treat issues about severity and pervasiveness as fact questions for juries,
rather than as questions of law.'0 7
In contrast, in Butler v. Ysleta Independent School District,08 Judge Patrick
Higginbotham, writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
upheld the entry ofjudgment for the defendant after a jury verdict for plaintiff in a
hostile environment claim. Plaintiffs were elementary school teachers who received
anonymous mail, with sexual overtones, at their homes.0 9 Upon investigation, the
anonymous sender was found to be their principal, who also was under investigation
for sending lewd facsimiles to male administrators. In upholding the district court's
entry ofjudgment, Judge Higginbotham announced:
To ensure the continued vitality of Title VII as a remedy for the sexual
harassment wrong, this court must separate meritorious claims from those
that identify offensive conduct but do not state a claim under Title VII.
The claims here fall in this latter category. While the letters the plaintiffs
received were undoubtedly immature and inappropriate, and while some
of the letters had a sexual content, a consideration of all the circumstances
does not permit the conclusion that the letters created a hostile or abusive
environment at the workplace."0
Judge Higginbotham's opinion reflects a restrictive approach to sexual
harassment cases, substituting the court's own view of "reasonableness" for that of
'o Id. at 343.
" Id at 347 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998)).
A "hierophant" is defined as "[a]n interpreter of sacred mysteries or arcane knowledge." THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 851 (3d ed. 1992).
07 See, e.g., Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., No. 98-1338, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
481 (8th Cir. filed Jan. 15, 1999) (exemplifying that summary judgment seldom should be
granted in discrimination cases); Leslie v. United Technologies Corp., No. 97-8212-CIV-
GOLD, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20900, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 1998) (denying a motion for
summary judgment because there was adequate evidence of racial harassment); Fall v.
Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 12 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (denying a motion for
summary judgment on the issue of whether one act of sexual assault sufficed to meet
requirements of a hostile work environment).
10 161 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1998).
,o9 See id. at 265.
"o Id. at 268.
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thejury. In Butler, the court determined that the alleged harassment was insufficient
as a matter of law because the letters were infrequent, were sent privately rather than
circulated publicly, were not threatening, and were not received at work."' In
addition, Judge Higginbotham asserted that the sexual content was irrelevant because
"[t]he letters here commented on the plaintiffs' personal lives and habits, but did not
state or suggest that they or women in general were incompetent to be teachers."
' 2
He asserted: "A plaintiff, however, must show that implicit or explicit in the sexual
content is the message that the plaintiff is incompetent because of her sex, and the
plaintiffs cannot draw such a connection here."'"1 3 Most surprising is that the Fifth
Circuit treated Oncale as almost an afterthought, asserting with no explanation that
it was not a hostile environment case, and, under the circumstances of this case,
Irwin's sending of offensive materials to both men and women is evidence that the
workplace itself, while perhaps more sexually charged than necessary, was not
sexually charged in a way that made it a hostile environment for either men or
women.114
The approach of the court in Butler to sexual harassment cases is all too typical
in that it analyzed the challenged conduct by disaggregating it into a series of
unconnected events, minimized the significance of those events, and then concluded
that no reasonable jury could perceive the facts otherwise." 5 A representative case
from the district courts is Landsee-Huschitt v. City of Crystal Lake." 6 Noting the
observation in Oncale that "[t]he prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex
requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior
so objectively offensive as to alter the 'conditions' of the victim's employment,""' 7
the court granted summary judgment to the defendant in his sexual harassment claim,
explaining:
1 See id. at 269-70.
112 Id. at 270.
113 Id.
"i' See id. Judge Higginbotham's opinion is particularly disturbing because of the
disingenuous way it cites to recent feminist scholarship on sexual harassment to support the
conclusion that the jury's verdict properly was set aside. For example, it is difficult to accept
his conclusion that when feminist scholars stress that the workplace is central to sexual
harassment claims, they somehow mean to suggest that a supervisor can harass female
workers at home without incurring Title VII liability. See id.
115 See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., No. 96-30212, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 710,
at * 17 (5th Cir. Jan. 19, 1999) (holding that a supervisor's remarks "were no more offensive
than sexual jokes regularly told on major network television programs" and, "[s]ignificantly,"
he never actually touched the plaintiff).
..6 No. 97 C 50235, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17856 (N.D. I11. Oct. 29, 1998).
117 Id. at * 11 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003
(1998)).
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Moreover, the evidence which could even arguably be considered to
support a sexual harassment claim shows that during a seven-month
period, plaintiff heard one pregnancy-related joke, saw one pornographic
picture, saw Playboy magazines in a drawer whenever she opened it, was
unable to use a bathroom on one occasion, was brushed against the
shoulder and had her meter book hid[den] once, was prevented from
filling her water bottle, and was shoved once. With the exception of the
shoving incident, the remaining conduct was innocuous on the sliding
scale of egregiousness, and all were isolated. A reasonable person could
not objectively find plaintiff was subjected to an atmosphere permeated
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, sufficiently severe
or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her employment."'
The court no doubt described the facts this way to minimize their significance,
but even through this prism, it is hard to credit the court's conclusion that no
reasonable person could find this constellation of facts and circumstances to be
sexual harassment. Nevertheless, many courts have taken a similar approach and
regularly entered judgment for employers without trial, relying at least in part on the
Oncale opinion,"9 and the debate is likely to continue as more courts grapple with
the meaning of Oncale.20
Id. at*14-*15.
"9 In a recent opinion by judge Edith Jones, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
explicitly contended that "the Supreme Court's decisions strongly suggest that [allegations
of sexual harassment] are not invariably to be resolved by the jury," and further urged:
"Motions for judgment as a matter of law can police the baseline for hostile environment
claims." Indest, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 710, at *16. See also Owens v. Commercial Testing
& Eng'g Co., No. 1:97-0908-RV-C, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18147 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 26, 1998)
(holding that innocuous racial comments were insufficient to constitute unlawful racial
harassment); Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2926 (MBM), 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5562 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1998); Crawford v. Bank of Am., 181 F.R.D.
363, 365 (N.D. I11. 1998) (granting summary judgment for a female who claimed harassment
by a male gay coworker's lewd stories).
32 In a panel discussion immediately after Oncale was decided, Judge Joseph Irenas of
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey suggested that Oncale would
encourage summary judgment for employers, arguing that the Court's emphasis on the
context in which the harassment occurred might encourage him "a little more to look at the
record and say 'in context, is this really harassment."' See Employment Discrimination-Sex:
Effects of Oncale are Discussed by Panel of Judges and Attorneys, supra note 93 (Judge
Manuel Real of the United States District Court for the Central District of California also
stated that Oncale gave employer motions for summary judgment "something of a boost" in
requiring a showing that the harassment occurred because of sex and that the harassment
actually altered the terms of employment. In contrast, Judge Charles Brieant of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York was more doubtful, noting: "It's
very difficult to grant summary judgment in employment cases in general" because of the
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III. JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE PLAIN MEANING OF ONCALE
What is the plain meaning of Oncale? More particularly, is it of any significance
that this pro-plaintiff holding comes in an opinion by Justice Scalia? Divining the
intent behind a Supreme Court opinion may be a favorite pastime of scholars but,
ultimately, it is a futile one. The Oncale holding itself suggests several reasons why
these efforts would be fruitless.
First, there is no doubt that Scalia vehemently has opposed what he has
considered to be unwarranted expansions of discrimination law, as indicated by
several fiery dissents' and the caustic opinion for the five-to-four majority in St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. 22 Nevertheless, in considering Oncale in context,
one must recall that it is not the first Scalia opinion to uphold a plaintiff's position
in an employment discrimination case. Indeed, a little-noted aspect of recent
discrimination jurisprudence is that Scalia has authored several unanimous opinions
for the Court resolving circuit splits in favor of plaintiffs. Many of these opinions
disposed of artificial rules that had been constructed by the lower courts to limit
liability. Those attempting to read Oncale as a pro-employer opinion masquerading
as a blow for civil rights must consider this backdrop.
In one notable example, Scalia wrote the unanimous opinion in O'Connor v.
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.' In O'Connor, the Court squarely rejected a rule
some circuits had developed that precluded a plaintiff from establishing a prima facie
case of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967124 ("ADEA") unless he or she could show replacement by a worker who was
outside the ADEA's protected class of workers forty years-old and older.'25 Scalia
indicated that the statutory language prohibiting discrimination "because of... age"
did not foreclose proof of such discrimination even when the plaintiff was replaced
by a younger worker who also was in the protected class.'26
many factual issues they generate.).
.2. See, e.g., Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 838, 845 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657-77 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
122 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Hicks were
particularly vituperative. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court reads so much like a dissent
that I have long believed that one vote switched at the last minute and that the opinion was
simply edited to become a majority opinion.
123 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
124 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
'25 See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996).
126 See id. Construing the statutory language, Scalia explained:
As the very name "prima facie case" suggests, there must be at least a logical
connection between each element of the prima facie case and the illegal
discrimination for which it establishes a "legally mandatory, rebuttable
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Scalia's opinion for a unanimous Court in Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 27 held that a state prison is covered as a "public entity" under
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.2' Indeed, Scalia noted, the
statute "unmistakeably includes State prisons and prisoners within its coverage 12 9
in its "unambiguous statutory text."' 30 Similarly, in his unanimous opinion for the
Court in Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc.,'31 Scalia resolved a
circuit split over how to count employees for purposes of the fifteen-employee
threshold of Title VII.'3 Most recently, in the 1998-1999 Term, Justice Scalia wrote
the opinion for a unanimous Court in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,
' 33
holding that a general arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement did not
require arbitration of claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Having identified this precedent, it goes without saying that Scalia is no closet
liberal. One readily might counter that Scalia's authorship of these opinions reflects
little about his real views on employment discrimination, and that the recent spate of
unanimous opinions on more technical issues in employment discrimination cases
simply papers over the deeper gulf in the Court over the substance of such claims.
The assignment of such unanimous opinions to more conservative justices like
presumption." The element of replacement by someone under 40 fails this
requirement.... Because it lacks probative value, the fact that an ADEA...
plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper
element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.
O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981) (citation omitted)).
127 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998).
128 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1990). The Act "prohibits a 'public entity' from discriminating
against a 'qualified individual with a disability' on account of that individual's disability."
Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. at 1954.
129 Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. at 1954.
130 Id. at 1956.
131 519 U.S. 202 (1997).
132 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) generally makes the provisions of Title VII applicable to any
employer who "has" 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. Scalia explained: "We think that
the payroll method represents the fair reading of the statutory language, which sets as the
criterion the number of employees that the employer 'has' for each working day." Walters,
519 U.S. at 207. He further noted: "In the absence of an indication to the contrary, words in
a statute are assumed to bear their 'ordinary, contemporary, common meaning' and relied
on dictionary definitions to further support his interpretation. Id. at 207-08.
133 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998).
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Scalia, Thomas, 134 or even Kennedy,'35 may reflect more about the internal dynamics
of the Rehnquist Court. To the extent that the conservative wing of the Court
believes that federal discrimination law ought to be interpreted as written, but no
further, it would be logical for Chief Justice Rehnquist to ensure that opinions that
speak for the whole Court do not contain any language that would expand the reach
of those laws. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the Supreme Court has resolved a
number of such circuit splits unanimously suggests that the evolution of
discrimination jurisprudence is more complex than a simple reflection of political
philosophy. It also should counsel prudence for those who seek to read into Oncale
a more restrictive meaning, based solely on the perceived intent of its conservative
author.
A second little-noted factor is that, for whatever reason, Scalia's own approach
to harassment cases has been surprisingly fluid. Before coming to the Court, one
easily could have identified Scalia as a foe of sexual harassment claims, based largely
on the fact that he joined Judge Bork's dissent in Vinson v. Taylor, 36 a case that a
unanimous Supreme Court later affirmed in the landmark decision of Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 137 His concurrence to the Court's unanimous opinion
in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,' 38 however, reflects far more ambivalence than one
might expect. In that opinion, Scalia expressed reservations about the ability of the
Court to elucidate a standard for evaluating when harassing conduct becomes severe
or pervasive enough to be actionable under Title VII. 139 In a comment that may
explain the concerns he later expressed in Oncale, Scalia noted: "As a practical
matter, today's holding lets virtually unguided juries decide whether sex-related
conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious enough to warrant an
"' See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (resolving a conflict
among circuits as to whether the term "employee" in Title VII covers former employees by
construing ambiguous term in light of the "broader context of Title VII and the primary
purpose of § 704(a)").
131 See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995) (rejecting the
"after-acquired evidence" rule in employment discrimination cases).
136 760 F.2d 1330, 1330-33 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd, Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
117 In Vinson v. Taylor, then-Judge Scalia joined Judge Robert Bork's strong dissent from
the denial of a motion to hear the case en banc.
138 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
39 See id. at 24-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
"Abusive" (or "hostile," which in this context I take to mean the same thing)
does not seem to be a very clear standard-and I do not think clarity is at all
increased by adding the adverb "objectively" or by appealing to a "reasonable
person's" notion of what the vague word means.
Id. 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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award of damages."' 4 Nevertheless, in perhaps a prophetic comment, Scalia
asserted:
Be that as it may, I know of no alternative to the course the Court today
has taken. One of the factors mentioned in the Court's nonexhaustive
list-whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee's
work performance-would, if it were made an absolute test, provide
greater guidance to juries and employers. But I see no basis for such a
limitation in the language of the statute. Accepting Meritor's
interpretation of the term "conditions of employment" as the law, the test
is not whether work has been impaired, but whether working conditions
have been discriminatorily altered. I know of no test more faithful to the
inherently vague statutory language than the one the Court today adopts.
For these reasons, I join the opinion of the Court.'
The difficulty of providing guidance to the lower courts on the meaning of an
ambiguous federal statute, while at the same time remaining steadfast to textualist
principles, seemed particularly troubling to Scalia in sexual harassment cases.' This
tension may explain his somewhat tepid attempts to instruct the lower courts in
Oncale. Just a few months later, Scalia joined Justice Thomas's dissent in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,43 rejecting the majority's attempt to resolve the
difficult issue of vicarious liability in sexual harassment cases. Thomas's dissenting
opinion sharply criticized the Court's scheme as "a whole-cloth creation that draws
no support from the legal principles on which the Court claims it is based," asserting
that "its holding is a product of willful policymaking, pure and simple."'44 He
attacked Ellerth as "based solely on its divination of Title VII's gestalt," and that "it
provides shockingly little guidance about how employers can actually avoid vicarious
liability. Instead, it issues only Delphic pronouncements and leaves the dirty work
40 Id. at 24. Scalia continued:
One might say that what constitutes "negligence" (a traditional jury question) is
not much more clear and certain than what constitutes "abusiveness." Perhaps
so. But the class of plaintiffs seeking to recover for negligence is limited to those
who have suffered harm, whereas under this statute "abusiveness" is to be the
test of whether legal harm has been suffered, opening more expansive vistas of
litigation."
Id. at 24.
141 Id. at 24-25.
142 Charles Calleros notes the irony that Scalia's textual approach produces a broader
holding than a more contextual reading might have generated. See Calleros, supra note 3, at
18-19.
43i 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2271-75 (1998).
,44 Id. at 2273-74.
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to the lower courts."' 45 Of course, it is precisely this type of criticism that has been
leveled at Scalia's equally Delphic analysis in Oncale.
Finally, Supreme Court opinions are not simply the product of one person. Even
unanimous opinions (or perhaps especially unanimous opinions) are the product of
compromise and, as such, the author of the opinion may include language to satisfy
some justices that does not necessarily reflect the way the opinion would have been
written had it been a solo effort. Thus, even if the justice who writes the opinion may
have a particular intent, his message may well be obscured by the necessities of
brokering an agreement. Indeed, even when Scalia plainly has sought to resolve a
split in the lower courts, often his opinion has produced more conflict than it has
resolved. The quintessential example of this phenomenon is Scalia's opinion for the
five-to-four majority in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.46 The Court split in a
bitter contest over the amount of evidence a plaintiff must produce to prove that the
employer's adverse action was a pretext for discrimination.'47 Scalia's opinion
stressed that the plaintiff must prove not simply pretext, but pretext for discrimination
in order to prevail.' Indeed, these passages echo the Court's insistence in Oncale
on using a disparate treatment model for analyzing sexual harassment claims.
Nevertheless, Hicks did not resolve the battle over the meaning of "pretext," because
ambiguous language in Scalia's opinion inevitably left open the very issue he sought
to foreclose-the possibility that plaintiffs could continue to prevail by proving
pretext alone.'49 The circuit split that preexisted Hicks continues, prompted largely
by this loophole left open by Scalia's majority opinion. 5
I V. CONCLUSION
Why does an apparently straightforward case like Oncale produce such
confusion? The actual holding of Oncale, which plainly favored plaintiffs, somehow
has become obscured by attempts to construe some supporting passages in the
141 Id. at 2274.
146 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
"47 See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of
the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991).
148 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515-20.
'41 See id. at 511 ("Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the
trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court of Appeals
was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, 'no additional proof of discrimination
is required."' (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 493 (8th Cir. 1992))).
5o The split in the circuits continues to grow, with the most recent entry being the en banc
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Aka v.
Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See, e.g., Acosta & Von Vorys,
supra note 101; Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1571 (1996).
[Vol. 7:3
THE PLAIN MEANING OF ONCALE
opinion in favor of employers. In casting Oncale as a pro-employer opinion, it
appears that many judges either read Oncale in light of their preexisting views of
how sexual harassment cases ought to be handled, or they interpret Oncale as a
reflection of the conservatism of its author. There is an unfortunate but undeniable
appeal to the latter approach, if only because it conforms to the reflexive
pigeonholing of Supreme Court justices that so many lawyers seem to favor.
In ultimately applying a new Supreme Court opinion, particularly one joined by
all nine justices, it is the holding of the opinion that must guide the lower courts, not
the assorted examples, exhortations, and suggestions that accompany it. In his
opinion in Hicks, Justice Scalia himself warned against the tendency to enshrine
Supreme Court dicta as law, justifying his rejection of the Supreme Court's long-
standing analysis of pretext cases by admonishing his colleagues against "dissect[ing]
the sentences of the United States Reports as though they were the United States
Code.""' If we are to take Scalia at his word, the attempts to discern some broader
intent in Oncale as guidance for applying the case to new fact patterns must be as
illegitimate in his view as the attempts to construe statutes by resort to legislative
history.52
The way to make sense of Oncale is to take it at face value, as a victory for a
plaintiff who alleged particularly egregious harassment. In light of the ambiguities
of Title VII's language, a court seeking to apply faithfully the words of the statute
had little choice but to reject the restrictive rule against same-sex suits that had been
adopted by some lower courts. Thus, whether or not Oncale reflects the "limitations
of a backward-looking textualism,"'5 3 the fact remains that its holding represents a
significant step forward in sexual harassment jurisprudence. Nine justices of the
Supreme Court, from both ends of the political spectrum, joined an opinion that
broadened the scope of liability for sexual harassment. That is the plain meaning of
Oncale. It is that holding, rather than the ambiguities in the brief opinion that
accompanied it, that should guide lower courts as they grapple with the complexities
of harassment cases.
... St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993); see The Supreme Court,
1997 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 333 n.74.
"52 For an analysis of Scalia's views on illegitimacy of resort to legislative history in
statutory construction, see Vermeule, supra note 4 1, at 1833. See also Scalia, supra note I.
113 Dorf, supra note 19, at 22-23 ("[Its determined textualism prevented it from even
identifying relevant considerations."). Dorf notes that the Court "refused to articulate a
normative vision of the evils the statute addresses." Id at 22. He asserts: "Unable to find an
original public meaning that spoke at all to sexual harassment and unwilling to construct an
objective purpose for its prohibition, the Court in its textualist mode could only fall back on
the vague language of the statute." Id. at 23-24.
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